Quantum private states are the states that represent some amount of perfect secure key. A simple symmetry of any generalised private quantum state (ie. the states that represent perfect key but not fully random) is provided and extended on Devetak-Winter so called ccq (classical-classicalquantum) and cqq (classical-quantum-quantum) lower bound on secure key. This symmetry is used to develop a practical method of estimating the Alice measurement that is optimal form the perspective of single shot Devetak-Witner lower bound on secure key. The method is particularly good when the noise does not break the symmetry of the state with respect to the lower bound formula. It suggest a general paradigm for quick estimation of quantum communication rates under the symmetry of a given resource like state and/or channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement is considered as a resource in quantum communication and computing. It has many intriguing properties that make in some cases quantum physics predictions drastically different from classical ones (see [1] ). Any BB84 type protocol [2] is formally equivalent to some version of entangled based protocol of the type E91 [3] . On the level of uncorrelated sources Bennett et al. pointed out this fact on specific scheme [4] which was later naturally extended to a quantum privacy amplification QPA [5] based entanglement distillation protocol [6] . The general intrinsic connection between BB84 secret key generation and possibility of maximal entanglement distillation from correlated sources of noisy entanglement was provided explicitly by elegant error correction type analysis [7] which in particular illuminated this aspect hidden in previous proofs. However the fundamental intuition behind the BB84 secret key generation -entanglement distillation equivalence is already present in the case of uncorrelated source for which QPA protocol works. The latter is a protocol that distills maximally entangled states out of a mixed states in a well defined way. In QPA it is eavesdropper that is representing the noise and the distillation procedure is aimed at remove the correlations with eavesdropper in the process that produces a pure output state -maximally entangled state that is a source of perfect key. It seemed that this QPA is necessary to get privacy. However there exists nondistillable entanglement called bound entanglement [8] for which by the very definition QPA in its original form can not work. It turns out that there is another possibility of distilling secret key by distilling private states [9] that are generalisations of maximally entangled states -they provide secret key under the measurement in a fixed basis on some part of the system. The measurement basis may be unique and that is what makes the private states more general form maximally entangled ones for which there are infinite many pairs of local bases that provide secure key. The distillation of private states allow to provide secret key form bound entanglement (see [9] ) showing in particular a possibility of drastic separation between amount of pure entanglement that can be distilled from a quantum state (called distillable entanglement and denoted by D) and amount of secret key that can be distilled from the same state (called disiilalble secret key and denoted by K). Recently the separation D < K was experimentally demonstrated together with the illustration how inefficient may be the original entanglement distillation based scheme, if compared with p-bit based protocols [10] .
In this article we present the new symmetry of the states with perfect secure key called generalized private states, which states that in the most popular Devetak-Winter protocol secret key rate is invariant in both scenarios of CCQ and CQQ type if the measurement bases, chosen in a wrong way, are rotated around the axis corresponding to the secure basis by any angle. Then we use this symmetry to propose a new method of searching the optimal basis, which allows to obtain optimal amount of distillable key with respect to the Devetak-Winter secret key rate, in the case when a state possessing this symmetry was rotated by an unknown angle. We investigate the influence of various qubit channels on the result of the method and show that the proposed method is an optimal one as long as a channel is bistochastic. Finally we derive the error estimation of numerical implementation of the procedure and show examples of the results.
are composite and correspond to the tensor products of Hilbert spaces H A ⊗ H A and H B ⊗ H B respectively. We call the subsystem corresponding to the pair A,B the key part since this is the part that is used for key generation by local von Neumann measurements while the pair A'B' is called the shield part since it is in a sense responsible for protecting the key. The above structure allows to write explicitly the pure state of the three parties which represents a perfectly secure random a perfectly secure random statistics p = [p 0 , ..., p d−1 ]. It is a pure state |Ψ AA BB of the following form which we shall call generalised private states:
for some fixed |Ψ A B E , some unitaries U
(i)
A B and probabilities {p i = |c i | 2 }. The basis |ii AB is called the secure basis since after performing the local von Neumann measurements in that basis Alice and Bob share the correlated probability distribution {p
i=0 which is completely uncorrelated form the system E. Here we do not assume them to be necessarily p i = 1 d as it is in the case of the private states. In fact the density matrix corresponding to the state vector (1) is of the form:
where we put |Ψ i = [U A B ⊗I E ]|Ψ A B E dropping the superscripts A B E. If Alice and Bob measure the subsystems AB in some basis {|e i A }, {|f i B } and trace the shield subsystems A B they get the so called the form of the CCQ state with respect to the (product) basis B AB = {|e i f i AB ≡ |e i A ⊗ |f i B }:
with some probability distribution q i . It happens that if they choose the basis {|e i f j AB } to be just equal to the secure one B 0 AB = {|ij AB } then the above state reduces to the product form
with q i = p i . Because of the explicitly product form -no correlations of the E system with the key part AB are present here. Before proving some new property let us remind that the so called CQQ state with respect to the basis B A = {|e i A which results form Alice local von Neumann measurement and tracing out both A'B':
Note that measuring the private state in the local basis B 0 A being just the reduction of the product secure basis B 0 AB we get still the CCQ state in the form (3) rather than the general CQQ state (note that any CCQ state is a CQQ one but not vice versa) which is a consequence of the private character of the state.
A. The Devetak-Winter protocol rates
We have a natural definition of the key rates in one-way protocols obtained by measuring the state first in some local basis B A or a product one B AB which will produce the CQQ or CCQ state respectively and then calculating the difference of the Holevo functions of the states: 
with the suitable reductions of the state ρ CCQ,B AB ABE resulting form the original state ρ ABE after the product of the two local Alice and Bob measurements corresponding to the bases B AB . The role of the function f is played just by the mutual information function I.
B. General symmetry rule and its simple application
In what follows we shall use the notationÛ (X) = U XU † andM ({P k })(X) = k P k XP k with a projectors P k = P (e k ) = |e k e k | for any orthonormal basis {e k }. We have a simple
Observation .-Consider a function f defined on any CQ state on the composite system XY
Assume that the function f is invariant under some subgroup R X of unitary operations R X ∈ R X on the system X ie.
Given any state ρ XY which is invariant in an analogous way
we have the following identity
for all R X ∈ R X and all {P k } constructed from any orthonormal bases {e k }.
Proof. -It is obvious to see that ,,internal"R † X is absorbed by the QQ state ρ XY while the external conjugated oneR X is absorbed by the invariance of the function f .
We have immediate conclusion: Conclusion.-The functions (4) and (5), if calculated on a given generalised private state (2), are invariant under the rotationsR A ⊗Î BE andR A ⊗R B ⊗Î E respectively where R A , R B are any unitary operations which are diagonal in the local bases |i A , |j B forming a secure basis of the states (2).
Proof .-The role of the pair of the subsystems {X, Y } is played by {A, BE} or {AB, E} respectively and the role of the subgroup are all the unitary operations diagonal in the bases described in the conclusion.
C. Consequences
In the case, when the key part dimension d = 2, this feature can be interpreted graphically. Let us consider CQQ case. Then Alice can choose two angels (θ, ϕ) to determine her measurement basis using the eigenvectors of the σn operator
We define the function
. Here superscript C(θ, ϕ) denotes that to calculate CQQ state base vectors determined by angels (θ, ϕ) were used. In spherical coordinate system, in which |e 0 (0, 0) , |e 1 (0, 0) coincide with the base vectors used in (2) the function K D (θ,ϕ) is ϕ independent, i.e. becomes function only of θ angle.
III. PROCEDURE
As follows from the previous section, points on the sphere [16] possessing the same vale of K D establish a circle, whose center is located at intersection of Z axis and the sphere. Moreover, each circle has a center in the same point (all circles are concentric). At this point vale of K D is maximal. Using facts presented in Subsection II C one is able to find such angles θ M ax , ϕ M ax , for which the measurement in basis given by (10) will lead to the maximal value of K D , without a priori knowledge of this basis or rotations by which the state was changed. Suppose that the original ideal state was rotated by unknown transformation U A ⊗ I BA B which eventually changed its optimal measurement basis on Alice side from {|0ẑ , |1ẑ } to {|0n , |1n } where we definen = Oẑ as:
The procedure is as follows.
1. First one chooses arbitrary values of angles θ 0 , ϕ 0 and establishes two base vectors |e 0 (θ 0 , ϕ 0 ) and |e 1 (θ 0 , ϕ 0 ) . This basis is used to perform measurement and to obtain value of
2. Then one changes the value of θ 0 to θ 1 and creates a set of base vectors
. Vectors from this set differ in the value of ϕ i angle by arbitrary constant factor 2π N so that 0 ≤ ϕ i < 2π. One can ascribe each vector from the set to a corresponding point on the sphere. These points lay on a circle, whose centre is located at the point ascribed to vector |e 0 (θ 0 , ϕ 0 ) .
3. Subsequently, using the vectors from the set, the measurements are performed and for each pair of vectors
The aim of these measurements is to find two points laying on a chosen circle, characterized by values of ϕ i angle, for which value of K Di is equal to earlier calculated value K D0 . It is not difficult to see that it is always possible to achieve this purpose when we assume continuity of ϕ (or arbitrary small resolution in ϕ i ). According Subsection II C, because the sphere is covered with circles with the same value of K D , any other circle laying on the sphere can have 0, 1, 2 or infinity intersection points. Thus it is always possible to find such values of θ 0 , θ 1 , which ensure that points with the same value of K D are found. Just as for a plane, three points on the sphere are enough to unambiguously determine the circle. The radius and the centre of the circle are found solving the system of equations:
where d is spherical distance defined as [13] :
here P, Q are two points on the sphere characterized by angles θ i , ϕ i and θ j , ϕ j , respectively. In therms of Cartesian coordinates (x = sin θ cos ϕ, y = sin θ sin ϕ and z = cos θ) expression (15) is of a form:
According to Subsection II C centre of the circle determined in this way is associated with the basis (characterized by angles θ M ax , ϕ M ax ), in which K D (θ, ϕ) has maximal value. Fig. 1 presents main ideas of the proposed procedure.
The proposed procedure can be slightly modified. Finding two points with value of K Di exactly equal K D0 can cause a problem and such solution is not a practical one. To overcome this difficulty, instead of finding two points with the same value of K D , one finds points K D1 , K D2 from the set K D,N , for which the values of K D1 , K D2 are the closest to the K D0 i.e. for which ∆K D1 = K D0 − K D1 and ∆K D2 = K D0 − K D2 are minimal. Subsequently the interpolating function I {K D,N } (θ 1 , ϕ) from the set K D,N is created. To construct the interpolation function Hermite polynomials of a required order are used. Thus one can write for i = {1, 2}:
where we use the fact that 
one obtains values of θ M ax , ϕ M ax . The proposed approach enables to find the basis optimizing the value of K D by performing only local measurements.
IV. ERROR ESTIMATION
Due to approximation (finite sum) and possible numerical errors, it is never possible to solve (17) exactly. As a result angles θ M , ϕ M will not lead to the maximal value of distillable key. In this section the estimation of this error is provided. Let us denote (see Fig. 2 ):φ
Without loss of generality, we can arrangeφ 1 ,φ 2 so thatφ 1 >φ 2 . Spherical distance between points characterized by angles (θ i , ϕ i ), (θ j , ϕ j ) is given by (15) . We assume that (θ i , ϕ i ) = (0, 0), so
Combining 23 and 24 we get:
Becauseφ 1 =φ 2 and ϕ M ∈ (0, 2π] there are two possibilities:
. However, we know only ϕ i , ∆ϕ i but we can estimate (see Fig. 2 ) as |∆ϕ i | < ∆ϕ − |∆ϕ i | . As a result
Combining equations (22) and (23) cot
As a consequence of the equality
we obtain the following relation
and
In order to obtain the upper bound on ∆θ M we have to findθ M -an lower bound on θ M . Then the following relation holds:θ
We have to estimate the difference ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 using known quantities ϕ 1 ,φ 2 . There are two different possibilities: in the first oneφ 1 −φ 2 < π whereas in the secondφ 1 −φ 2 > π. Let us consider the first one. Because arccot x ∈ (− . For our purposes we shall assume the worst case, namelyφ 1 < ϕ 1 andφ 2 > ϕ 2 . Then ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 >φ 1 −φ 2 . From previous considerations the following relation holds:φ i + ∆ϕ > ϕ i >φ i − ∆ϕ i . As a resultφ 1 −φ 2 + 2∆ϕ > ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 >φ 1 −φ 2 . Using this inequality we get
Ifφ 1 −φ 2 > π the similar line of reasoning leads to
Finally one gets
whereθ M i , i = {1, 2} is given by (33) or (34). Using perturbed points (θ i ,φ i ) one obtains the point (θ M + ∆θ M , ϕ M + ∆ϕ M )which differs from the real point (θ M , ϕ M ) by (∆θ M , ∆ϕ M ), where ∆θ M , ∆ϕ M are given by (31) and (27). In the new coordinate system associated with the point (θ M + ∆θ M , ϕ M + ∆ϕ M ) the error is given by:
V. CONDITIONS FOR INVARAINCE OF KEY RATE IN CASE OF LOCAL ACTION OF PAULI CHANNELS
According to [11] , using appropriate unitary operation
A B (called twisting) it is possible to write a particular private state as:
where |Ψ + is one of the four Bell states |Ψ ± , |φ ±
After sending (37) down the channel Λ A ⊗I where Λ A (·) = i p i K i (·)K † i with K i = {I, σ x , σ y , σ z } (note that twisting commutes with the action of the channel) one obtains a statẽ
The purification of this state is given by
whereĒ, E denote Eves' subsystem. It follows from (4) that we can trace over subsystems A'B'E (due to additivity of Von Neumann entropy for tensor product states K B A DW is independent of subsystems A'B'E). In order to find the value of the key rate due to Devetak -Winter protocol (4) we calculate the cqq state using base vectors defined by (10) . The nonzero elements of the reduced AB matrix are given by
As a result entropies of Alice and Bob are equal S A = S B = 1. The reduced AB matrix is block diagonal so its eigenvalues are
As a consequence, I A:B will be independent of ϕ angle if and only if p 1 − p 4 or p 2 = p 3 . In order to minimize joint entropy S A:B one has to set θ = 0 or θ =
In order to show that I A:Ē is independent of ϕ and let us consider a state resulting from the measurement performed onĒ subsystem. This operation does not increase the value of I A:Ē (which we denote as I 
After measurement the reduced AĒ matrix has following eigenvalues
2 whereas the eigenvalues ofĒ matrix are given by λ 1 = p 1 , λ 2 = p 2 , λ 3 = p 3 , λ 4 = p 4 so we obtain that I A:Ē is independent of θ. As a result if p 1 = p 4 or p 2 = p 3 the distillable key will preserve its invariance and the proposed procedure will be valid.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide some examples of the results obtained by implementing the above procedure numerically. Rotated ρ SW AP state. -Consider a private state introduced in [9] and realized experimentally [12] 
This state was rotated and then the optimizing procedure was applied. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 3 . Depolaraizig channel. -The procedure was checked using the rotated stateρ SW AP = Λ A ⊗ I BA B , where Λ(ρ) = p I 2 + (1 − p)ρ. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 4 . Phase flip channel. -Another test was performed using the rotatedρ SW AP = Λ A ⊗ I BA B , where Λ(ρ) = pρ + (1 − p)σ z ρσ z . The example of the results is shown in Fig. 5 .
Rotated mixture of ρ SW AP and ρ M SW AP states. -Another example of the private states is a state
This state plays a role in bound entangled secure key [14] . We checked the procedure using rotated mixture of two private states ρ priv = pρ SW AP + ( 
which transforms the Bloch vector r = [r x , r y , r z ] T of the state into r = [cos ur x , cos vr y , cos u cos vr z + sin u sin v] T . It follows from Section V that in general this channel does not preserve the invariance of distillable key. In this case the procedure fails. The example of the results is shown in Fig. 7 .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper the new symmetry of the states with perfect secure key called generalized private states have been provided which says that the most popular Devetak-Winter protocol secret key rate is invariant in both scenarios of CCQ and CQQ type if the measurement bases, chosen in a wrong way, are rotated (in a sense of angular momentum) around the axis corresponding to the secure basis by any angle. The symmetry has a particularly good interpretation when seen on a sphere since then the wrong is any basis corresponding ton with an angle θ to theẑ axis (corresponding to the secure basis) while the symmetry rotation is just the rotation by the φ angle around thê z axis. We have also proven that for the qubit key part the optimality of theẑ axis as the secure basis is preserved after the action of any bistochastic channel (i.e. the one represented by random Pauli rotations).
The symmetry of the ideal p-bit lead us to the heuristic scheme of estimation of the optimal axis (with respect to the Devetak-Winter secret key rate K DW ) which is valid for any state that has this type of symmetry of the key rate under the rotation around the optimal basis. Namely given the density matrix, may be even in a numerical form, instead of searching over all sphere Alice may perform the analysis of the key over a ring around some chosen axisẑ on the sphere and guess the optimal measurement axis only on the data based on this ring.
The method generally has a ,,dualistic" character with respect to the channel action. If the Alice subsystem as the direction of the optimal axis unperturbed, than the results are good if theẑ is chosen to be far form the (unknown) optimal oneẑ while if there is a perturbation of the optimal directionẑ (in a sense of the shrinking of that direction on a Bloch sphere) then the closer is the chosen axis to the original one the result is better. Basing on the polynomial approximation of the key function on the chosen ring there is also the possibility of the derivation of the error bar FIG. 1: Local Alice's sphere with two different coordinate systems. Z axis corresponds to θMax, ϕMax angles whereas Z' to θ0, ϕ0 angles. Black circle shows the path along which angle ϕ changes. At the intersection point between Z axis and the sphere KD(θMax, ϕMax) = KDMax. The intersection point between Z' axis and the sphere is denoted by (θ0, ϕ0). At this point KD(θ0, ϕ0) = KD0. Points with the same value of KD (laying on a circle, whose center is located at the point KD0) are denoted by (θ1, ϕ1) and (θ1, ϕ2). At the first point KD(θ1, ϕ1) = KD1, whereas at the second point KD(θ1, ϕ2) = KD2.
FIG. 2:
Starting point for the procedure (θ0, ϕ0), in which K (θ0, ϕ0) = KD0. Point (θ1, ϕ 1 ), KD0 = K (θ1, ϕ 1 ) is closest to the point (θ0, ϕ0) in the given set because∆KD1 = |KD0 − KD1| is minimal (see text for details). Using the interpolation function one obtains that K (θ1, ϕ 1 + ∆ϕ 1 ) = KD0, however, due to numerical error, in fact ϕ 1 + ∆ϕ 1 = ϕ1, where the equality KD (θ1, ϕ 1 + ∆ϕ 1 ) = K (θ0, ϕ0) really holds. The case of the second point (θ1, ϕ 2 + ∆ϕ 2 ) is similar. The error of the procedure is given by (36).
of the procedure. The analysis of examples shows that the error bar in general bounds the actual value of the error made in the procedure.
We believe that the present method may be especially useful when the large sample of data are provided and quick estimation of optimal Alice measurement is needed.
FIG. 3:
The estimated error of the procedure (using formula (36)) -left plot, and the error of the procedure (absolute value of the difference between rotation angle and the angle calculated by the procedure ∆θ = |θ − θ M | ) -right plot vs. the number of points r=10n (n=1 denotes that 10 points were used) for the rotated ρSW AP state. Rotation angle θ = , p= 3 10 . Different colors correspond to different choices of θ1 angle in (20): blue -θ1 =0.0025 π, red -θ1 =0.005 π, orange -θ1 =0.0075 π, red -θ1 =0.01 π. In agreement with (36), for all cases the estimated error of the procedure constitute an upper bound on the error. The error of the procedure is orders of magnitude smaller than its estimated value.
